

Operation Uphold Democracy: Power Under Control

by Robert F. Baumann ©

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Perhaps the greatest challenge the military faces in conducting operations other than war (OOTW) today-by whatever terminology we choose to describe them-is setting realistic goals and identifying meaningful measurements of success.¹ US civilian policy makers and military leaders have been wrestling with the problem in one form or another for over two centuries. In fact, such operations have been more common than wars. Simply put, confusion stems from three principal sources:

- Military operations that rely heavily on show of force, presence or peace enforcement occur in an inherently ambiguous environment, especially in the area of rules of engagement.
- They offer few concrete objectives or sign posts that permit an intervening force to reliably determine the success of its efforts.²
- The placement of combat forces in situations that put a much higher premium on restraint and adaptability than on warrior skills, which form the main focus of soldier training and indoctrination, creates an inescapable tension.

Each of these sources of complexity is magnified several times over by virtue of the fact that OOTW typically entails working in a foreign cultural environment most soldiers can little understand. Indeed, Americans in general, whether working for military or civilian agencies, are not renowned for their cross-cultural awareness.

Probably no recent case better illustrates the finely nuanced difficulty of such deployments than Operation Uphold Democracy. The US Army's deployment to Haiti reflects an attempt to learn from past mistakes. The operation was wildly popular with the native populace and, by most accounts, scored some notable successes. However, there is cause to question what we actually did accomplish in a strategic sense. The following discussion looks at what the US Army actually did and the situation we left behind.

Rationale and Mission

Notwithstanding the high level of approval that greeted the performance of American, multinational and UN forces in Haiti, *Time* correspondent Johanna McCreary issued a challenging mission appraisal in February 1996: "When the post-Cold War book of rules for global intervention is written, the lesson of the Haiti chapter will be this: define your goals so minimally that it will be easy to meet them, declare victory and go home."³ McCreary went on to assert that the mission's most critical element was the timely departure of American soldiers, thereby ensuring that US engagement in Haiti would not become protracted, costly and politically unpopular. The assessment's most damning aspect was the conclusion that in the end, Haiti remains a basket case with bleak future prospects.⁴ Whatever the US mission accomplished, it produced little change to suggest that the beleaguered nation, born of history's only

successful revolution engineered by slaves, is retreating from the abyss of social chaos and deepening human tragedy.

In a separate but equally blunt 1996 critique by the Strategic Studies Institute at the US Army War College, Donald Schultz maintained that overall neither American politicians nor their Haitian counterparts were anxious to address the Caribbean republic's root problem: the existence of an embedded system of behavior and values that cripples the development of a stable, democratic polity, economic growth and a social infrastructure beneficial to the average, impoverished citizen. The reasons, Schultz maintains, are that Americans are disposed to seek a "quick fix" which will not require a commitment to nation building.⁵ On the other hand, most Haitian politicians and their co-nationals living abroad resent the notion that Haiti's problems are fundamental, reaching to the core of their political culture. They prefer to believe the "predatory state" that has dominated their country for so long owes its existence to a picked group of corrupt leaders and their paid henchmen.⁶ The implication is that good leaders, backed by international aid, can turn Haiti's fortunes around.⁷

In a larger sense, Schultz concludes that the US-sponsored mission in Haiti, whatever its short-term achievements, will fail in historical terms because of a widespread lack of will to face an unpleasant reality. Worse yet, "The danger facing the United States and the international community is that they will have raised Haitian expectations only to dash them through an unwillingness to do what is necessary to give the democratic experiment a real chance of success."⁸ By inference we can expect an eventual return to domestic turmoil accompanied by a flood of refugees who will once again be looking north for sanctuary.

The complex of circumstances that prevailed in Haiti in 1993 argued vigorously that something be done. Historically impoverished and politically unstable, Haiti was in desperate straits even by its own humble standards. Its people lived in the most abject poverty found in the Western Hemisphere, and its democratically chosen president carried on in exile in the United States while a military junta headed by General Raoul Cedras ruled by blood and terror at home. In addition, the human tragedy confronting President Bill Clinton was the flotillas of pathetic refugees eager to face peril at sea rather than remain in Haiti. As fugitives stacked up in holding camps and the Cedras regime stalled in implementing the Governors Island Accord provisions-which directed return of power in Haiti to the elected government-a response was imperative.

The arrival of the USS *Harlan County* at Port-au-Prince harbor, intending to deliver a firm message to the junta, backfired. Lacking clear authorization to use force if necessary, either to pull into port or to protect his vessel, the captain withdrew when a few small, armed Haitian patrol boats and a throng of rowdy, hostile demonstrators on shore threatened to turn Haiti into the "next Somalia."⁹ Thus, the signal actually delivered was that the United States and the international community lacked the resolve to risk bloodshed over Haiti. This perception emboldened the junta and its allies and hung international aid and human rights workers inside Haiti out to dry.¹⁰

At last, however, the stage was set for Operation Uphold Democracy. At the National Command Authority's direction, US Atlantic Command initiated joint planning based on two clear options. According to Operations Plan (OPLAN) 2370, the XVIII Airborne Corps operated as Joint Task Force (JTF) 180 with the mandate to execute a violent seizure of key sites in Port-au-Prince in order to wrest authority from the illegal junta. The second option, expressed in OPLAN 2380, formed JTF 190 around the 10th Mountain Division (Light) [10th MD (L)] to conduct a permissive entry into Haiti, based either on acquiescence by the Cedras regime or a handover of control from JTF 180 in the aftermath of a forcible entry. In the meantime, just to be on the safe side, 10th MD (L) planners prepared for the

contingency that a permissive entry might be less than completely permissive. In short, JTF 190 had a "takedown option" of its own, if needed.

No one could anticipate the actual sequence of events by which US forces would enter Haiti. US Army Captain Berthony Ladouceur, who served as adviser and chief linguist for JTF 180 commander Lieutenant General H. Hugh Shelton, openly speculated that the Cedras regime would back down at the last possible moment to avoid a face-off with a US invasion force. He believed resistance would be minimal.¹¹ What "thickened the plot" was the late-breaking negotiation mission to Haiti headed by former President Jimmy Carter, General Colin Powell and Senator Sam Nunn.¹² Talks continued up to D-Day, 19 September, as the window for heading off an invasion closed. Only a phone report by a spy working for the junta in Haiti that US aircraft were departing Pope Air Force Base, North Carolina, brought about the Cedras government's capitulation.

The last-minute accord averted violence but also struck directly at the soft seam between the forcible entry plans of JTF 180 and the handoff to JTF 190. The forcible entry plan was already under way and 82d Airborne Division elements were in flight to Haiti when conditions on the ground changed. Recalling the 82d and putting the 10th MD (L) in motion was not in itself difficult. The catch was that critical support and logistics assets had been committed to implement the forcible entry plan and could not be instantly diverted to the 10th MD (L) and associated units. Consequently, port and airfield organization, not to mention establishing living areas for US soldiers, suffered severe dislocation. Originally, planning had fully accounted for either JTF 180 going in and, after about a week, handing off control and assets to JTF 190, or for JTF 190 to go in on its own with all support assets under its control from the start. Planning had not allowed for the abortion of a forced entry by JTF 180 hours after it deployed.

On the Ground in Haiti

Rapidly changing circumstances imposed the unwelcome burden on Shelton to improvise new rules for the game as it was being played. As Shelton put it, ". . . never in my wildest imagination did I think I would be coming in here with the mission of cooperating and coordinating in an atmosphere of mutual respect."¹³ Completely unforeseen was the necessity of working out arrangements with Cedras and collaborating in the streets with Haiti's widely despised army and police-the *Forces Armées d'Haiti* (FAd'H) -to effect a smooth return to democratic rule.

Scarcely less difficult was the psychological adjustment required of US commanders and soldiers; they had to scrap the mission to defeat the "bad guys," then become partners with them in implementing political transition. The change in US posture not only clouded the soldiers' sense of purpose but baffled the Haitian populace as well. Inclined to view the Americans as liberators-at least initially-ordinary Haitians experienced bewilderment and unfulfilled expectations. Many Haitians expected, even thirsted for, an orgy of revenge against their oppressors. This Shelton could not permit. Realization that a deal had been cut and that the leaders of the military would go unpunished caused palpable disappointment among most Haitians.¹⁴

Shelton had to convince Cedras and the FAd'H that, although he was not there to seize and arrest them forcibly, he would brook no interference with his mission, the center of which was their removal from positions of power and authority. According to Ladouceur, Shelton adopted the right public pose from the start. He arrived at Port-au-Prince International Airport in battle dress uniform and beret, exuding the assurance of one who knows he is in charge-though in fact he had no way of knowing whether all the official and unofficial armed factions in Haiti would honor the *Carter-Cedras Agreement*.¹⁵

A more delicate problem was controlling the decompression of Haiti's societal tensions. Immediately dissolving the existing police force would create a vacuum that neither US military police (MP) nor international police monitors were prepared to fill. Yet, neither could the police be permitted to carry on as before or simply be trusted to mend their ways. Thus began the complex task of supervising the police force in the streets-which frequently meant defending it from angry citizens prepared to seek the full measure of mob justice-while discreetly purging it of its most notorious human rights abusers. The multinational force laid a foundation for creating an interim police force even as it organized a training program to establish an entirely new, professionally indoctrinated one.



Soldiers enter a building suspected to contain a cache of weapons, Cap Haitien, October 1994.

The new police force's credibility in the Haitian public's eyes as well as those of international observers was a constant source of anxiety. The UN's intent was to build a new force within the constraints imposed by the overall timetable for the international presence in Haiti. As a practical matter, it was expedient to retain FAd'H officers who were found relatively untainted by the organization's abysmal human rights record.¹⁶ However, such retention troubled President Jean-Bertrand Aristide and others. Even while acknowledging that "the scorned Interim Public Security Force (IPSF) has achieved some successes," attorney William O'Neill, a consultant to the National Coalition for Haitian Refugees based in New York City, believed the program was seriously flawed. For example, O'Neill noted, "These interim police officers received just four days training and hardly ever left their barracks except when

accompanied by the United Nations International Police Monitors." Even more serious, he contended, was the assignment of former police officers to the new one: "These officers have not only been exposed to the vicious military/police culture of the Haitian army, but they have not received the rigorous four-month academy training."¹⁷

Key to buying time for the police forces' maturation and the staging of elections was establishing a "safe and secure" environment across Haiti. What that meant in concrete terms was left to the discretion of commanders on the ground. Some disagreement in approach would be natural and predictable; however, in this instance, the divergence of approaches reflected something deeper.

There was a marked difference in operational styles between the 10th MD (L) in Port-au-Prince and US Army Special Forces (SF) teams distributed across Haiti's remote interior and coastal towns. From its arrival in Haiti, the 10th MD (L) put a premium on force protection-the physical security of its soldiers on the ground. Force protection is always a central concern when US troops are deployed and the parents of every US soldier in Port-au-Prince expected no less. Equally demanding in this respect were the politicians at home and proponents and critics of the Haiti mission. The abrupt US policy change in Somalia following the deaths of 18 US Army Rangers in Mogadishu etched this concern indelibly in the memory of every officer and soldier assigned to the 10th MD (L). Its leaders soon realized the Haitian scenario was different but chose to err on the side of caution.

The force protection focus manifested itself from D-day on. As US soldiers massed at the Port-au-Prince International Airport, 10th MD (L) leaders vigorously forbade any fraternization with the throngs of friendly Haitians just across the fence. As the Americans established their living compound at the Light Industrial Complex, they wore helmets and body armor virtually anytime they were outdoors, despite the

intense heat. In general, US soldiers rarely left the guarded living compound, with the exception of daytime patrols, MP units and PSYOP teams. From a leadership perspective, the policy not only ensured force security, it was conducive to the preservation of soldierly standards of good order and discipline. To the populace, the intended message was that we would not let our guard down. However, not all force members were comfortable with that posture. According to a study on stress and psychological readiness of US troops in Haiti, many soldiers thought that they were contributing little in Haiti, that the obsession with force protection was "unnecessary" and that they were being micromanaged.¹⁸

In any case, after securing the airfield, ports and living compound, three broad tasks remained. First, the 10th MD (L) had to neutralize all possible armed factions in the city, locating as many hidden weapons caches as possible. This became one primary role of civil affairs (CA) officers assigned to JTF 190. Infantry, MP and tactical PSYOP teams (TPTs) successfully induced elements of the Revolutionary Front for the Advancement and Progress of Haiti (FRAPH) and attachés to surrender and relinquish their weapons with scarcely any resort to violence. PSYOP teams broadcast surrender

warnings and terms in Creole, and to the collective relief of all, the message was almost universally heeded.¹⁹ The PSYOP role across Haiti was mainly informational-an especially important and persuasive role in a country not accustomed to being kept informed by its leaders. Radio Democracy and Television Democracy kept the mission's progress and associated thematic messages before the public. The effect was both to increase the multinational presence's legitimacy and prepare public opinion for developments to come. Still, Haitian violence in the streets remained a problem. TPTs were dispatched on 22 September 1994 aboard helicopters and in high-mobility, multipurpose, wheeled vehicles (HMMWVs). The teams were to emphasize peaceful assembly in their communications.²⁰

After the mission's first few days, the perception developed at JTF 180 headquarters-which remained in Haiti to support Shelton and the political mission to orchestrate the departure of Cedras and the return of Aristide-that the 10th MD (L) was slow in getting out of its compound to establish a real presence and interact with the populace. Lieutenant Colonel Edward Anderson, a JTF 180 CA officer, noted, "There was clearly no appreciation [in the 10th] for the fact that the only way to conduct an operation like this is to get out and see people, meet people and gain their confidence." He added, "If you treat the population as hostile, that will become a self-fulfilling prophecy."²¹ In the same spirit, the Joint Psychological Operations Task Force (JPOTF) advised Major General David Meade that US patrols should establish a more visible presence in the streets to avoid a "siege mentality" characteristic of recent operations in Somalia.²²

A 10th MD (L) soldier searches a man turning in a weapon during the Gourds for Guns Program, September 1996.

By 2 October, the JPOTF and the JTF 180 staff on board the USS *MT. Whitney* discerned another disquieting trend in the Haitian perception of the multinational mission. The appearance of joint US-FAd'H patrols and the impunity with which the hated attachés continued to operate in Port-au-Prince undermined the mission's credibility. Finally, Colonel Jeffrey Jones, the JPOTF commander, bluntly asserted in a memorandum to Shelton that US forces appeared "impotent, and to some degree irrelevant."²³



The prodding apparently had an effect. Just a day later, Task Force (TF) 2-22 executed weapons seizures at five sites in Port-au-Prince. At about the same time, Operation *Mountain Strike* began to clean out known FRAPH gathering spots. Most surrendered in response to broadcast warnings, and even the holdouts gave up when infantrymen commenced building clearing operations, obviating any concerns about exchanges of gunfire.²⁴

As security concerns abated, engagement in the capital began to increase. In mid-October, 10th MD (L) soldiers began contributing to the "Adopt-a-School" program to help repair and distribute supplies. Shortly thereafter, multinational forces (MNF) contingents began arriving. Overall, JTF 190 and 10th MD (L) soldiers conducted themselves professionally, avoiding unnecessary clashes with Haitians and inordinate dependence on the MNF.

In Cap Haitien, after receiving a handoff from the US Marines on 2 October, the 10th MD (L)'s 2d Brigade, under Colonel James Dubik, quickly established an atmosphere of order and stability. At the year's end, the mission's turnover in Port-au-Prince, the 25th Infantry Division (Light) [25th ID (L)], was about as smooth as could be expected, thanks to advance coordination, country visits by Tropic Lightning personnel and orientation briefings and training materials provided by analysts from the Center for Army Lessons Learned at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas.

The training package included not only TPT-related lessons, but situational vignettes drawn from actual unit experiences in Haiti. The result was that the 25th ID (L) arrived ready and showed no hesitation in establishing its presence in the streets, although it, too, emphasized force protection.²⁵ In March, when mission control passed to the UN, the 25th ID (L) was running smoothly, and calm prevailed in Port-au-Prince. Engagement became ever more central to the mission. After arriving in October 1995, Colonel John Donovan, 1st Brigade commander, 101st Airborne Division, and Zone V commander in Haiti, made it policy that "every person on the staff" walk patrols so as to better grasp local conditions.²⁶

In the meantime, SF teams, arrayed from the beginning across Haiti in a "hub and spoke" network, arguably accomplished even more with less in an economy of force role. Projecting outward from forward operating bases in Jacmel, Cap Haitien and Gonaives, SF A-Teams assumed an astonishing variety of functions. Lacking both large numbers and resources, the teams demonstrated a remarkable ability to adapt to local conditions and take the initiative.

This is not to say that SF did not experience similar difficulties as the 10th MD (L), especially as a result of the switching of entry plans in midstream. For instance, as the forcible entry mission screeched to an

unexpected halt, SF troops found themselves without aircraft to deploy into Haiti.²⁷

Once in-country, however, SF quickly implemented a posture of maximum engagement of the populace. SF elements recognized the low level of the threat and expanded their reach accordingly. They established contact with community leaders, explained the purpose of their presence and moved proactively to stabilize the political environment. SF teams arrested the worst criminals and human rights abusers as identified by the local populace, made clear to outlying FAd'H garrisons they expected full cooperation and operated as instructors in basic civic philosophy and practical principles of town government. Where necessary, they prodded judges to clear up huge backlogs of unresolved cases, many of which had resulted in the prolonged detention of citizens without hearings or formal charges. On occasion, as when SF soldiers entered Les Cayes, they found extremely grim conditions in the local prison.²⁸ SF teams directed the police to correct the horrendous prison conditions, called town meetings and organized citizens to tackle basic cleanup and repair projects. They took pains to limit their role to providing initiative and organizational assistance while demanding that Haitians themselves develop the self-reliance to bring plans to fruition.

Perhaps most remarkable of all, SF teams under-took many tasks without resorting to elaborate security measures or the "bunker mentality" that initially kept the overwhelming majority of the force in Port-au-Prince confined to its compound. Small and scattered as they were, SF teams needed all hands to execute the mission of engaging the populace and reinvigorating civil life in scores of rural towns and villages.

SF teams got invaluable support from PSYOP and CA officers and the Joint Special Operations Task Force in Port-au-Prince. Equally crucial was the availability of emergency "back-up" in the form of helicopter mobile quick reaction forces provided by Army Rangers and infantry from the 10th MD (L). For instance, after an SF soldier in Les Cayes was shot, Rangers quickly deployed to the scene to demonstrate the vast combat power constantly "on call" to remote A-Teams. More than anything else in Haiti, this arrangement demonstrated the complementary employment of SF, SOF and conventional forces.

In reality, the overall working relationship between SF and conventional forces troops in Haiti was awkward, at times even disagreeable. Friction between the two stemmed largely from basic differences in branch culture. The training and indoctrination of SF soldiers emphasizes individual self-reliance, flexibility and pragmatism that do not always neatly conform to the sense of strict order and discipline which pervades the culture of conventional units. As soldiers who have worked in both cultures sometimes attest, a certain amount of mutual misperception is common because different kinds of performance are expected.²⁹

An Army officer questions a man believed to be the president of the FARPH organization for the southern region of Haiti.

History suggests that to some degree this has always been so. Though not perfectly analogous to 20th century SF forces, soldiers in France's colonial expeditionary forces during the 19th century also operated in relatively small contingents and had to adapt extensively to local conditions. Of course, they did not operate in small, elite teams or live like native villagers, but as a consequence of operating for extended periods in utterly foreign environments where they waged unconventional wars,



they were perceived by their home armies as "different." Opinion back at general staff headquarters in Paris often held that colonial soldiers had "gone native" and were sometimes given to display a disturbing informality.³⁰ By the same token, soldiers operating on Russia's imperial borderlands tended to see officers from the home army as inflexible and poorly suited to warfare on distant frontiers.³¹

Mutual misperceptions were not altogether unfamiliar to US troops in Haiti. For example, in a noteworthy incident at Camp D'Application in Port-au-Prince, SF and conventional forces soldiers had an awkward encounter resulting in about equal measure from poor prior coordination and divergent purposes. SF soldiers from 3d Group had arrived first to take control of the camp, including the training academy, barracks and equipment. Their mission was to secure the FAd'H's compliance and cooperation with the MNF in Port-au-Prince. Army SF elements firmly but politely explained the rules of their new working relationship, including the plan to share the barracks, and began to establish a rapport. This process no sooner began than a conventional unit from the 10th MD (L) arrived to secure all the hardware belonging to the FAd'H special weapons company, believed to pose one of the few significant military threats in Haiti. Accordingly, they showed up with armored vehicles and assumed a menacing, combat-ready posture that directly contravened the SF's work. Members of the FAd'H suddenly felt like prisoners rather than partners, and the SF felt their credibility had been undermined by the intimidating actions of their conventional counterparts. Subsequently, a gesture by a SF soldier to ease the tension elicited hard feelings on the conventional side. Hoping to convey to now-fearful FAd'H members that the situation was not as grave as it appeared, the SF soldier managed to lead the assembled multitude in performing "a wave." Now the conventional soldiers felt their credibility was being questioned and a flurry of complaints and charges ensued.³²

Perhaps no episode better reflected the ambiguity of the environment into which US troops were thrust in Haiti. At times, some SF and conventional forces alike believed the mission in Haiti placed them in roles that did not correspond to their primary training and purpose. They nevertheless carried on.

The Haiti We Leave Behind

US planners defined "exit strategy" in Haiti to mean "the planned transition to the host nation of all functions performed on its behalf by peace operations forces."³³ In the opinion of scholar Michael Mandelbaum, "The exit strategy became the mission."³⁴ Still, key preconditions for departure—basic order, the return of Aristide and the conduct of a presidential election resulting in a peaceful transfer of power—were met.

Beyond this, by the Army's own internal standards, its units on the whole performed well. Logistics, communications, PSYOP, CA, public affairs, aviation, MP, Rangers and medics showed proficiency in their designated roles, often overcoming much adversity along the way.

Of course, the full withdrawal of international forces, including a small number of US soldiers, did not occur on schedule and is still pending at this article's writing. The most obvious reason is that not much has really changed in Haiti. The new Haitian National Police, while not doing badly for a fledgling force, is struggling to control the streets, especially in the expansive slums of City Soleil. Politically motivated violence has not ceased and newly elected President René Préval has been forced to clean up his own security force. Above all, the fractious and violent nature of Haitian political life persists. Extreme poverty, a poor climate for foreign investors, overpopulation, ecological ruin and deep-seated racial (mulatto versus black) and class antagonisms remain fundamentally untouched by nearly three years of intervention. Perhaps more could and should have been done, but the prospects for long-term success would still have been problematic and a protracted foreign presence would have risked wearing out its

welcome in Haiti.

Yet, it may be premature to label the mission that began with Uphold Democracy a wasted effort. Haitians have been granted a brief respite from turmoil and despair. To date, the international intervention can claim three substantive accomplishments: the restoration of a semblance of order, the return to electoral politics and the rapid formation of a new police force indoctrinated in basic democratic civic values. As a result, the operating climate for international assistance agencies has improved. Democracy, though not firmly planted, has had a chance to sprout new roots. The Haitian National Police holds at least some promise for an improvement in civil life, although the judicial system on the whole functions poorly.³⁵ Finally, US Army engineers and others carried out carefully targeted improvement in the national infrastructure such as assistance in repairing roads, restoring electrical power and rehabilitating crumbling buildings.

None of this has brought fundamental change, however. As Lieutenant Colonel Thomas Adams noted in a recent issue of *Military Review*, Americans still have difficulty comprehending the depth and intractability of Haiti's social problem, although it would be fair to say that we are neither as naive nor arrogant in this respect as during the first major US intervention.³⁶

Maybe, if nothing else, US forces left behind the germ of an idea. In the words of US Army Major Tony Schwalm, "We left an example of power under control."³⁷ The embracing of that concept alone, so contrary to its traditions, would do much to improve civil life in Haiti. And, unlike the last US departure in 1934, this time most Haitians may actually regret our leaving. This may be important if only because, should Haiti collapse into chaos and repression once again, we may find ourselves compelled to return.**MR**

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1. LTC John B. Hunt, "OOTW: A Concept in Flux," *Military Review* (September-October 1996), 3-9.
 2. Kevin C.M. Bensen and Christopher B. Thrash, "Declaring Victory: Planning Exit Strategies for Peace Operations," *Parameters* (Autumn 1996), 69-80.
 3. Johanna McCreary, "Did the American Mission Matter?", *Time*, 12 February 1996, 36.
 4. *Ibid.*, 36-39.
 5. Donald E. Schultz, *Whither Haiti?* (Strategic Studies Institute: Carlisle Barracks, PA, 1996), 20.
 6. For a discussion of the "predatory state," see Robert Maguire, "Defanging the Predatory State," *Hemisphere*, Volume Seven, Number One, 1996, 14-16.
 7. Schultz, 2-4.
 8. Schultz, x.
 9. LCDR Peter Riehm, "The USS Harlan County Affair," unpublished paper presented at the Mid-American Latin American Studies conference at Fort Leavenworth, September 1996.
 10. Bryant Freeman, keynote address delivered at the Mid-American Latin American Studies conference at Fort Leavenworth, September 1996.
 11. Major Berthony Ladouceur, oral history interview conducted by LTC Walter Kretchik and Robert Baumann at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, 10 March 1997.
 12. For Powell's account, see Colin Powell, *My American Journey* (New York: Ballantine Books, 1996), 581-86.
 13. Interview with LTG H. Hugh Shelton, CINC JTF 180, 22 October 1994, conducted by LTC Steve Dietrich, *JTF 180 Uphold Democracy* interviews (Washington, D.C.: Center for Military History, 1996), 62.
 14. LTC Thomas Adams, oral history interview conducted by John Fishel, LTC Walter Kretchik and

Robert Baumann at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, 16 November 1995.

15. Major Berthony Ladouceur, oral history interview.

16. COL David Patton, oral history interview, conducted by John Fishel and Robert Baumann, 13 January 1996, at the Light Industrial Complex, UNMIH, Port-au-Prince.

17. William O'Neill, "Building a New Haitian Police Force and Justice System," *Haiti Insight* (October-November 1995), 1, 3, and 8.

18. Faris R. Kirkland, Ronald R. Halverson and Paul D. Bliese, "Stress and Psychological Readiness in Post-Cold War Operations," *Parameters* (Summer 1996), 85.

19. Steven D. Brown, "PSYOP in Operation Uphold Democracy," *Military Review* (September-October 1996), 69.

20. MAJ James Boisselle, "Communicating the Vision: Psychological Operations in Operation UPHOLD DEMOCRACY," 17, unpublished paper submitted for independent research elective at the US Army Command and General Staff College (CGSC), 1996. An edited version of this paper will appear in an anthology of focused research articles to be published by the Combat Studies Institute, CGSC.

21. LTC Edward J. Anderson, JTF 180, J3 civil affairs officer, oral history interview, 10 October 1994, by LTC Steve Dietrich, JTF 180 Uphold Democracy oral history interviews (Washington, D.C.: Center for Military History, 1996), 386. It is possible that had the 10th MD (L) assumed a more active role from the start, the famous incident involving Captain William Rockwood, who entered the Haitian National Prison to seek an accounting of prisoners against orders, would not have occurred. A minority of soldiers have expressed some sympathy for Rockwood's position in interviews. In any event, it is worth noting in the context of selling the mission to the Haitian public that Rockwood's action was much admired among Haitians. This issue will be considered at greater length in the forthcoming history of *Uphold Democracy*.

22. Boisselle, 17.

23. Ibid., 20. The author cites the 2 October memorandum in note 28.

24. Ibid., 20-21.

25. MG George A. Fisher, unpublished Joint History Interview Transcript, Multinational Force Haiti, conducted by MAJ Burton Thompson Jr., 8 May 1995; MAJ Chris Hughes, oral history interview conducted by Robert Baumann, MAJ Christian Klinefelter, and MAJ Marty Urquhart, March 1996, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. Hughes also develops this subject in his CALL briefing, 2 November 1994.

26. COL John Donovan, oral history interview conducted by Robert Baumann and MAJ Robert Shaw, 16 January 1996, at the Light Industrial Complex, UNMIH, Port-au-Prince.

27. COL Mark Boyatt, oral history interview conducted by Robert Baumann and LTC Walter Kretchik, 7 March 1997, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas.

28. COL John C. Alterburg, JTF 180 Staff Judge Advocate, oral history interview conducted by LTC Steve Dietrich, JTF 180 *Uphold Democracy* oral history interviews (Washington, D.C.: Center for Military history, 1996), 325.

29. MAJ Tony Schwalm, oral history interview conducted by MAJ John Cook, 11 February 1997, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas; MAJ Tony Schwalm, oral history interview conducted by Robert Baumann and LTC Walter Kretchik, 20 March 1997, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas; US Army LTC (name not yet released) interviewed by Robert Baumann, 28 February 1997, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas.

30. Douglas Porch, "Bugeaud, Gallieni, Lyautey: The Development of French Colonial Warfare," in *Makers of Modern Strategy from Machiavelli to the Nuclear Age*, ed. Peter Paret (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1986), 376-78.

31. Robert F. Baumann, *Russian-Soviet Unconventional Wars in the Caucasus, Central Asia, and Afghanistan*, Leavenworth Paper Number 20 (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Combat Studies Institute, 1993), 35-36, 76-7.

32. Interview with SF soldier (name not yet released) in Port-au-Prince, 16 January 1996. MAJ Gary

Brockington, oral history interview conducted by MAJ Donald McConnaughay and Robert Baumann, 6 February 1996, Fort Leavenworth, KS. Brockington did not witness the "wave" incident but confirmed that reports of the incident came to him as the deputy staff judge advocate at US Army Special Forces Command at Fort Bragg.

33. Bensen and Thrash, 72-3.

34. Michael Mandelbaum, "Foreign Policy as Social Work," *Foreign Affairs* (January/February 1996), 25.

35. However, a recent article in *Time* magazine suggests otherwise. See "A Constabulary of Thugs," 17 February 1997, 62-63. The article's subtitle reads, "Haiti's U.S.-trained police force has turned into a gang of rogue cops who torture and murder."

36. Adams, 54.

37. Schwalm interviews.

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